Photo By Daniel Suchenski
Policy Memo: Conditions for Democracy in Afghanistan
By Daniel Suchenski
While America’s war on terror rages in Iraq and occupies most of the United States time, money and effort, it is not the only war America faces. To the East of Iraq lies the larger and equally complicated situation of Afghanistan. Sometimes called the ‘forgotten war,’ the war in Afghanistan faces the same problem of reconstruction and stability. While it has been America’s stated intention to democratize and make Afghanistan free from terrorist elements, establishing democracy is sometimes harder than some would like. The military successes in Afghanistan have demonstrated the awesome technological prowess of the U.S. military, however, as the campaign evolves into a nation-building operation, America has found that our skills in the social and political arena do not match those of our military. It seems clear that given the historical and current situations of Afghanistan, the country is not yet capable or willing to embrace real democracy. It therefore seems clear that the United States should reexamine its long-term commitments to the country and look for more stable yet open minded government that is in time with the desires and needs of the people of Afghanistan.
Historically speaking “Afghanistan has never had ruling elites who sincerely advocated democratic principles.”1 This lack of support from the elites is part of the unsuccessful story of democracy in Afghanistan. Even attempts at parliamentary institutions by Zahir Shah in the 1960’s to “modernize Afghanistan’s educational system and initiate political reforms.”2 Unfortunately the reforms that Zahir implemented “fell far short of real democracy” because ultimate authority still remained in the hands of the king.3 This imbalance of power meant that the Zahirs parlimentary institutions lacked “the decision-making authority of a truly democratic representative legislature.”4 Recently President Karzai and leaders of at least some of the country’s main ethnic groups now support democracy in principle.5 However, “tribal leaders and a large number of local officials in Afghanistan’s provinces remain determined to uphold traditional laws and customs, in contravention of democratic principles and Afghanistan’s new constitutional order.”6
This is not the first time in Afghanistan’s history that tribal leaders and local officials have stringently upheld traditional laws and customs and resisted change. In the early twentieth century Amanullah Khan ascended the throne, a progressive leader Amanullah Khan “gave Afghanistan its first constitution, placing the king under the rule of law and establishing the legal equality of all citizens.”7 Taking his reforms further Amanullah Khan “encouraged Agfhan women to study abroad and participate in public life.”8 The reaction to Amanullah Khan’s social and educational reforms “triggered fierce resistance throughout the socially conservative countryside”9 The resistance against the reforms reached such an extent that Amanullah Khan and his government were unable to suppress the revolt, and forced Amanullah Khan to flee abroad in 1929.10 More than forty years later the resistance to reform from the tribal leaders and local officials that forced
Amanhullah Khan to flee from Afghanistan would once again be tested. A coup lead by a radical faction of Afghanistan’s communist party and based on Soviet-inspired communist principles took control of the country in 1978 and reform was once again on the minds of the ruling elite. Hafizullah Amin, the leader of the coup and head of government began changing Afghanistan so it could more closely resemble that of the Soviet Union. But the “regimes attempts to change long-standing social customs provoked strong opposition from Afghanistan’s tribal leaders and Islamic clerics.”11 The Afghan people’s reluctance to embrace communist doctrine, should not be misconstrued to mean that they therefore more favorable to democratic principles, rather that militia leaders, tribal leaders and local officials are more concerned with wielding their own local power than anything else. This
historical reluctance to change and reform is one of the most principle obstacles that President Karzai’s government faces. Local authorities unwillingness to cede power to the national government in Kabul is proving to be a serious obstacle to the central governments efforts to “extend the authority of the Afghan state’s new institutions over the entire country.”12
Despite all the obstacles President Karzai and his government face toward national unity, Afghanistan is not entirely without a semblance of democratic institutions that could serve as an incubator of state legitimacy and a possible full-fledged democracy. The Loya Jirga was a Pashtun tribal or village council.13 A more “important Grand Council, or Loya Jirga, met in 1747 to choose a new king (shah) for Afghanistan.”14 In the years following this Grand Council, “various Afghan monarchs periodically summoned a Loya Jirga to legitimize their authority or gain advice on important political decisions.”15 In the 1920’s the Loya Jirga became institutionalized as the county’s highest representative body.16 But despite the Loya Jirga’s importance as a ligitimizing device, its democratic authenticity remained limited.”17 In addition to its limited authority, the Loya Jirga was also “rarely inclusive: membership was usually overwhelmingly (and often exclusively) male, and confined mostly to Pashtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group.”18
The U.S. vision for a postwar Afghanistan relies on the familiar recipes of democracy and massive foreign aid. Unfortunately, neither is likely to work effectively. Actually, Afghanistan might be in worse shape than Iraq. The American intervention toppled the Taliban regime, but has left nothing to replace them. In fact the war has returned the country to a medieval state of warlords and fiefdoms; a
situation that resulted in 25 years of factional fighting and civil war.
References:
1 Sodaro, Michael. 2008. Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction. Third Edition. Boston: McGraw Hill. 246. 2 Sodaro, Michael. 2008. Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction. Third Edition. Boston: McGraw Hill., 246. 3 Ibid, 246. 4 Ibid, 246. 5 Ibid, 246.
6 Ibid, 246. 7 Ibid, 243. 8 Ibid, 243. 9 Ibid, 243. 10 Ibid, 243. 11 Ibid, 244. 12 Ibid, 246. 13 Ibid, 246. 14 Ibid, 246. 15 Ibid, 246. 16 Ibid 244. 17 Ibid, 246. 18 Ibid, 246.
